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Abstract: Remote Internet voting systems still suffer from many security problems 
which rely on the clients, the servers, and the network connections. Denial-of-
service attacks and viruses still belong to the most challenging security issues. 
Projects and studies like the “Voting Technology Project” of CALTECH and MIT 
or SERVE of the US Department of Defense set up to gain experience evidence 
many of the notional weaknesses of current Internet voting systems. 
1 Introduction 
Theoretical research about the security of electronic voting systems started many years 
ago and countless approaches have been proposed since then. Not only motivated by 
academical research, but also quickened up by the US-presidential election’s dilemma in 
2000 several practical  projects were conducted to assess the feasibility of electronic 
voting systems over the Internet. But reducing election problems to the counting process 
itself – as it might happen due to the big election in 2000 – clouds some more issues to 
be faced. How many votes have been destroyed, how many eligible voters have been 
disenfranchised from voting, how many votes have been altered in the context of 
absentee voting? Most people trust in the established offline voting procedures and show 
little interest in security issues as long as computers and networks are not involved. 
Actually, the real extent of election fraud is undetected, only some are known and 
published. The report of CALTECH and MIT [CM01, p.3] mentions: “Our data show 
that between 4 and 6 million votes were lost in the 2000 election.” Jefferson et al. [Je04, 
p.11] report: “A recent example [of election fraud] involved boxes of paper ballots that 
were found floating in San Francisco Bay in November, 2001.” 
These incidents alone strongly motivate the discussion of the use of Internet voting 
systems and their ability to successfully address election fraud. Furthermore, supporters 
of these systems argue that there will be a higher voter turnout and more trust in 
elections. But unfortunately, using the Internet with its current architecture and protocols 
would cause more security trouble than we can handle. 
The paper is about this trouble and the Internet’s inappropriateness for remote voting 
scenarios. Section 2 shows the differences to e-commerce systems and discusses security 
aspects concerning the voting clients, voting servers, and the network connections 
between them from a theoretical point of view. Supplementary, section 3 summarizes 
Internet voting reports of some of the most important projects and links these 
experiences to the insights gained in section 2. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 
4. 
2 Security problems 
Security issues of Internet voting systems can be discussed from many points of views, 
e.g. technology driven, political science driven, or judicial driven. I address this field 
with a technology view, focussing especially on voting servers, voting clients, and the 
network infrastructure enabling the client-server-connections. 
2.1 Differences to e-Commerce 
Sometimes it is assumed by mistake that safely conducting commercial transactions over 
the Internet with SSL and server-side certificates means that one can also safely vote 
online using the same mechanisms. However, this is wrong, as Internet voting is 
different in many aspects [Je04]: 
 Elections are inseparably linked to democracy and malfunctioning election 
processes can directly and decisively influence it. Democracy relies on broad 
confidence in the integrity of elections. Consequently, Internet voting requires a 
higher security level than e-Commerce does. 
 It is not a security failure if your spouse uses your credit card with your consent, but  
the right to vote is usually1 not transferable. 
 A denial-of-service (DoS) attack might occur and prevent you and others from 
performing e-Commerce transactions. But generally there is a broad time window 
and after detecting and fixing the DoS attack business can be transacted. In the 
context of Internet elections a DoS attack can result in irreversible voter 
disenfranchisement and the legitimacy of the entire election might be compromised. 
For example, voters who want to cast their ballot during the last minutes of the 
voting time window would have no other voting channel available. 
 Business transactions require your authentication by sending passwords, PINs, or 
biometric data. Voting however, requires authentication only when you register for 
an election and when you cast your ballot due to autorization, but concurrently 
demands anonymity to the vote (decision). This implies the adoption of much 
complexer security protocols. 
                                                          
1 Exceptions must be allowed for blind and other handicapped people. 
People can detect errors in their e-Commerce transactions as they have audit trails: they 
can check bills and receipts and when a problem appears recovery is possible through 
refunds, insurance, or legal action. Vote receipts (showing the vote decision and proving 
that the vote was unalteredly counted) must not be made out, as otherwise votes can be 
paid and extortion might occur. 
2.2 Assumptions and focus 
I consider only those voting scenarios whose voting protocols base on public-key-
cryptography, certificates, and a public key infrastructure without addressing the 
protocols itself detailed, but this is no strong constraint. Furthermore I assume the 
potential voters to use ordinary PCs with Windows or Linux software and an arbitrary 
connection to the Internet. 
Technological security issues are to be found in several dimensions (see figure 1, for a 
more detailed discussion see [Sch04]), but below I focus on hardware, software, and 
infrastructure as some of the most critical issues from my point of view. Voting 
protocols aren’t less important but are basically out of range of this article. 
 
Figure 1: Security dimensions for voting systems [Sch04, p.7] 
The following subsections address security issues of the client, the (voting) servers, and 
the connections between clients and servers. In particular I look at the voting process 
itself as opposed to online voter registration, which is a separate, but important and 
difficult problem. 
2.3 Client related security issues 
One of the most significant problems clients are facing is malicious payload (programs 
and configurations). Rubin [Rub02] analyzes this problem: There is virtually no limit to 
the damage viruses, Trojan horses, sniffing programs, etc. can cause. Although the 
presence of security defense software (virus and intrusion detection) becomes more and 
more widespread the current state of the art does often not go much beyond comparing a 
program against a list of signatures. If the security software vendor hasn’t updated his 
definition files due to unknown signatures e.g., then a computer might remain 
unprotected for a while including the voting window. The option that the malicious 
payload and its signature will not be detected makes it all even worse. Using trusted 
software in the sense of signing software by a trustworthy entity and checking the digital 
signature of programs sounds like a sustainable concept, but this means that each piece 
of software has to be signed and checked. First, there is no software or hardware 
architecture supporting this, and secondly,  Jefferson et al. [Je04] report cases where 
people were tricking Microsoft into signing a malicious ActiveX control. Summing up 
today there is no foolproof test for weather or not malicious payload is installed. 
Rubin [Rub02] mentions the software Back Orifice 2000 (BO2K) that is freely available 
and fully open source tool for remote control of a computer. Once it is installed on a 
machine, it enables a remote administrator (or attacker) to view and control everything 
on that machine. As it is open source, an attacker might change the code so that is 
remains undetected by security defense software (due to a new signature). As it runs in 
stealth mode even a sophisticated administrator would have difficulties to detect it. 
Voting decision could be read, changed, and blocked from being sent without discovery. 
As election dates are known in advance the activation of malicious software can be 
effectively triggered. The Chernobyl virus for example was scheduled for April 26, 
1999, and affected many computers by modifying the BIOS in such a way that they 
couldn’t even boot. If that happens on the day of an election many eligible voters would 
be disenfranchised. Politically ambitious attackers could target a particular demographic 
group aiming at a direct effect on the election’s result. 
And even worse it does not take a very sophisticated malicious payload to disrupt an 
election, as easy web browser attacks demonstrate. Most common browsers come with 
an option for a proxy setting that indicate that all web communications should take place 
via a proxy; the proxy is interposed between the (web) client and the (web) server and 
completely controls all Web traffic between these two. The proxy option can be easily 
changed by just adding a few lines to the preference file. Using the Netscape browser 
you just change the file prefs.js by adding these lines indicating that all web traffic goes 
to the corresponding server and port: 
user_pref(“network.proxy.http”, www.malory.com); 
user_pref (“network.proxy.http_port”, 1799); 
Although proxies cannot be used to read information in a secure connection, they can be 
used to spoof a user into a secure connection with the attacker, instead of the actual 
voting server. 
Unfortunately, there are many ways for attackers to attach malicious payload to common 
PCs,  most of us have probably experienced at least one option. 
 Malicious payload can be installed by having physical access to the computer. 
Administrators in companies have full privileges on many computers and can infect 
them using setup routines on floppy disks and CDs. Many more scenarios are 
possible granting full physical access to an attacker.  
 Most common malicious code is distributed via emails. Think about Melissa, I Love 
You, Sobig.F, and MyDoom/Novarg which infected probably millions of computers 
in a very short time. You don’t even have to open an email attachment to get 
infected, e.g. the virus Bubbleboy was triggered as soon as a message was previeved 
in the Microsoft Outlook mailer. We can observe an alarmingly increasing activity. 
 Buffer overflows are a known and well used point of attack. This kind of attack 
occurs when a process assigns more data to a memory location than was expected 
by the programmer. Web server programs and web browsers have proved to be 
susceptible for buffer overflows when arbitrary attacker’s code can be executed. 
Buffer overflows are one of the most common form of security flaws in deployed 
systems today. 
 A widely accepted but also dangerous way of executing programs is the use of 
ActiveX controls which are native code residing on the web server and attached to 
web content. If your browser’s settings allow ActiveX controls to be executed they 
are automatically and maybe unknowingly downloaded and started. Trojan horses 
can be installed that way and on day of election brought to attacking execution. 
Many people use ActiveX controls as browser plug-ins, screen savers, calendars, 
etc., consciously or not. ActiveX controls can perform as man in the middle. This 
attack together with spoofing is addressed in the next subsection. 
 Vendors of widely spread software like graphic programs, word processing 
program, etc. are in a strong position to change software and configuration files 
while the setup process is running. On day of election the changes can compromise 
or bother the voting process on this machine. Just let one rogue programmer of the 
software vendor be interested in subverting an election. 
Authentication in the context of a public key infrastructure is done by signing data with 
the private key. Assumed the voter has a private key it must not be stored on the hard 
disk , floppy disk, CD, or USB stick, but should be kept on a secure key store like a 
smart card. As smart card readers are not directly connected to voting servers (voting) 
data flow through the insecure PC environment where it can be changed or blocked. 
Blocking of votes is easy: malicious code ensures that the vote gets not forwarded to the 
voting server. 
Changing the vote is possible when you actually sign other data than you intended to 
sign: While your computer’s display makes you believe you sign your vote for party A 
the malicious code changes your vote in favor of party B and sends this to the card 
reader. If this reader has no dedicated display allowing to double-check the vote then the 
voter might be fooled. The attacker doesn’t even have to know your private key. 
Consequently, card readers without a(n) (expensive) display are insecure in this sense. 
Most voting systems don’t even integrate any kind of card readers as they are not widely 
spread. 
Today, mobile devices as voting clients drop out [IPI01, p.16]. Beside technical security 
problems displays are still limited in terms of display area, color, and resolution, as well 
as text input capability. They may easily be lost or stolen, and the cost for providing 
these devices to registered voters could be prohibitive. 
Rubin [Rub02] sums it up: “In current public elections, the polling site undergoes careful 
scrunity. Any change to the process is audited carefully, and on election day, 
representatives from all of the major parties are present to make sure that the integrity of 
the process is maintained. This is in sharp contrast to holding an election that allows 
people to cast their votes from a computer full of insecure software that is under the 
direct control of several dozen software and hardware vendors and run by users who 
download programs from the Internet, over a network that is known to be vulnerable to 
total shutdown at any moment.” 
2.4 Server related security issues 
The problem of DDOS attacks affects all participating servers. In this section we focus 
on the voting servers but generally the considerations can be applied to all servers. 
Attacks where legitimate users are prevented from using a system by malicious activity, 
are known as denial-of-service-attacks (DOS attacks). If many attacking machines 
collaborate to mount a joint attack on the target machine we talk about a distributed DOS 
attack (DDOS attack). In this scenario,  an attacker could take control of many 
computers (called “zombies” or “slaves”) in advance by spreading a virus or worm, and 
the slaves are waiting for instructions of a master computer to blindly follow them. 
There are mainly two forms of (D)DOS attacks: (1) The adversaries swamp the network 
connection of the targeted server with junk data that clogs up the network and prevents 
other, legitimate traffic from getting through. The SYN flood attack that exploits a 
weakness of the Internet protocol TCP is a famous example. (2) The adversaries are able 
to overload the server’s computational resources with useless tasks that keep it busy. 
SSL-protected websites are susceptible to this kind of(D)DOS attack as the SSL protocol 
requires the recipient to perform a slow cryptographic operation (typically an RSA 
private-key computation). 
Suffering a DDOS attack voting servers are in danger of being cut off from the Internet 
and eligible voters resulting in their disenfranchisement. If DDOS attacks are targeted 
demographically (regional voting server is attacked) and we have a close voting 
campaign then they could sway the election. DDOS attacks are huge and real problems 
and no effective protection mechanism is known. 
Many DDOS attacks have occurred, an example of an DDOS attack on domain name 
servers is reported in the following subsection. 
Another (easier) way  to target a machine and to make it crashing is the ping of death 
attack [Rub02]. 
If voting clients would act as DRE (direct recording electronic) voting systems they 
wouldn’t suffer from (D)DOS attacks as they could store the vote and send it later. 
Unfortunately, this approach seems currently not feasible, because it is not practical or 
desirable for PCs to emulate all the characteristics of DRE systems2 [IPI01]. 
2.5 Connection related security issues 
The sore spot of connection related attacks is the fixed election time window. Attackers 
can focus the last hours of the election window and paralyze the network of a region that 
is assumed to vote for candidate A by the majority. Even a quick fixing can take some 
hours resulting in the disenfranchisement of voters and affecting the election’s result. 
One form of attack affects the Internet’s Domain Name Service (DNS). The DNS is used 
to maintain a mapping from IP addresses, which computers use to reference each other 
(e.g. 134.130.176.7) to domain names, which people use to reference computers (e.g. 
www.winfor.rwth-aachen.de). The DNS is known to be vulnerable to attacks. Currently, 
there are just 13 DNS root server, some big companies additionally mirror them. In 2002 
the DNS servers were exposed to a distributed denial-of-service-attack (DDOS) where 
several servers were fully loaded.3 If on election day the DNS servers aren’t available for 
many voters, then a connection to the vote server is not possible. Only those voters who 
know the IP address of their voting server could vote then. 
Another attack is DNS spoofing where the true IP address of a domain name is 
overwritten with a fake IP address. The control of DNS root servers might be difficult, 
but the heavy use of DNS caching (on local or regional servers due to speeding up) 
makes this impossible. Although answering this problem with the protocol DNSSec 
(RFC 2535 und 2931) would be effective, its practical impact is low. Facing DNS 
spoofing the voter follows the instruction for voting and enters the denoted domain 
name. But unknowingly he gets a wrong IP address and he is spoofed into a 
communication with an attacker. He might receive a page that looks like the voting page. 
Then the attacker acts as man in the middle giving him the power to abolish votes. The 
same happens in the context of social engineering: an attacker sends emails to voters 
containing links to the attacker’s computer. When they look authentic many people 
would trust this email. Theoretically, this kind of spoofing can be effectively addressed 
with digital certificates of web sites, but today most people are not familiar at all with 
SSL connections and certificates and hence wouldn’t check or discover this fraud. 
                                                          
2 For more information about DRE systems visit http://www.verifiedvoting.org/drefaq.asp. 
3 http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A828-
2002Oct22&notFound=true 
Similar attacks could also work against the registration process. Eligible voters could be 
let to believe that they registered successfully, when in fact they were communicating 
directly with the adversary and not interacting with the legitimate registration server. 
The voters would discover when attempting to vote they were not registered. This could 
exclude them from voting. 
Not to forget are attacks on Internet router which forward IP packets through the Internet 
to the server and back. If IP routers fail due to DDOS attack a whole region might be 
unable to cast votes. 
Some attacks could be mitigated with the existence of a vote receipt proving that your 
vote arrived. As this receipt must not contain the vote decision4 (see discussion above) 
itself it just proves that a vote decision arrived. There is no guarantee of data integrity, 
i.e. your vote could have been changed on your computer, on a computer in the network, 
or on the voting server. Many DRE (direct recording electronic) voting systems don’t 
have any sort of voter-verified audit trail. Furthermore, how can you be sure that your 
vote was actually counted and not left behind? Traditional elections don’t feature this 
problem as the whole process can be peered (except for absentee balloting). 
3 Internet Voting Reports 
Some projects have been set up to scrutinize the appropriateness of the Internet for a 
remote voting system. The most important ones are the Voting Technology Project of 
CALTECH and MIT [CM01], A Report on the Feasibility of Internet Voting of the 
California Internet Voting Task Force [CV00], A Security Analysis of the Secure 
Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE) [Je04], the National Workshop 
on Internet Voting of the Internet Policy Institute [IPI01], and i-vote of the Research 
Group Internet Voting [IV02]. 
Most projects come (after a detailed security discussion) to the conclusion that today the 
Internet should not be used for remote voting as the architecture, protocols, hardware, 
and software feature many vulnerabilities that could easily allow attackers to 
compromise elections. Only the German study [IV02] looks a bit more optimistical on 
Internet elections. Two projects [CV00; IPI01] distinguish between several stages of 
Internet voting and concede practicability for supervised Internet voting clients. The 
following subsections summarize the results of the corresponding reports. 
                                                          
4 The Internet Policy Institute [4, p.19] discusses an approach that provides voters with the ability to vote 
multiple times, and have only the last vote count. However, some practical problems arise and make this 
concept difficult to be implemented.  
3.1 CALTECH and MIT: Voting Technology Project 
The CALTECH/MIT Voting Technology Project was initiated academically and 
conducted cy the California Instituite of Technology and the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology as an interdisciplinary approach. It is not restricted to Internet voting 
scenarios. 
However, regarding Internet voting they find [CM01, p.15; 42]: “However, Internet 
voting, in the judgment of many experts, is not ready for wide-scale use. There are three 
problems. First, there are concerns of coercion if Internet voting is done from remote 
locations, such as the voter’s home computer. Second, large-scale fraud is more likely 
because it is easier to hack the entire system if it is on the Internet, than it is to 
coordinate many millions of voters voting at precincts or thousands of poll workers. 
Third, many people do not have computers at home or are sufficiently intimidated by 
computers that Internet voting (either from home or at the precinct) might create a 
further obstacle to voting for millions of voters. […] Delay Internet voting until suitable 
criteria for security are put in place.” 
3.2 California Internet Voting Task Force: A Report on the Feasibility of Internet 
Voting 
The California Internet Voting Task Force was convened by Secretary of State Bill Jones 
to study the feasibility of using the Internet to conduct elections in California. 
They define four steps of Internet voting and propose an evolutionary approach where 
stages 1 and 2 feature a supervised use of an Internet voting machine and stage 3 and 4 
integrate remote Internet voting: (1) Internet Voting at Voter’s Polling Place, (2) Internet 
Voting at Any Polling Place, (3) Remote Internet Voting From County Computers or 
Kiosks, and (4) Remote Internet Voting from Any Internet Connection. 
The opinion of the Task Force is [CV00, p.1f]: “At this time, it would not be legally, 
practically or fiscally feasible to develop a comprehensive remote Internet voting system 
that would completely replace the current paper process used for voter registration, 
voting, and the collection of initiative, referendum and recall petition signatures. 
[…] However, current technology would allow for the implementation of new voting 
systems that would allow voters to cast a ballot over the Internet from a computer at any 
one of a number of county-controlled polling places in a county. […] The success or 
failure of Internet voting in the near-term may well depend on the ability of computer 
programmer and election officials to design a system where the burden of the additional 
duties placed on voters does not outweigh the benefits derived from the increased 
flexibility provided by the Internet voting system.” 
3.3 A Security Analysis of the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting 
Experiment (SERVE) 
The SERVE voting system was built for the U.S. Department of Defense’s FVAP 
(Federal Voting Assistance Program) [DoD01] and intended to be deployed in 2004 for 
U.S. citizens living overseas; participating states are Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, and Washington. In the meantime the Pentagon refused 
to deploy the system in 2004 due to strong security concerns [DoD04]. A heavy security 
discussion was triggered by the security analysis report conducted by independent 
scientists. They disclosed they the SERVE voting system suffers from most security 
risks discussed above, stating [Je04, p. 3]: “Because the danger of successful, large-scale 
attacks is so great, we reluctantly recommend shutting down the development of SERVE 
immediately and not attempting anything like it in the future until both the Internet and 
the world’s home computer infrastructure have been fundamentally redesigned, or some 
other unforeseen security breakthroughs appear.” 
Surprisingly, without any security discussion it was announced that overseas voters can 
still vote by fax [DoD04]. 
3.4 Internet Policy Institute: National Workshop on Internet Voting: Issues and 
Research Agenda 
The National Workshop on Internet Voting was funded by the National Science 
Foundation (NSF) and conducted by the Internet Policy Institute and the University of 
Maryland. It was former President Clinton who requested the NSF to examine the 
feasibility of online (Internet) voting. 
Internet voting systems are grouped into poll site systems where voting machines are 
placed in traditional polling places, kiosk systems with voting machines located in 
convenient locations as malls, libraries, and schools, and remote systems where any 
computer that is Internet accessible might serve as a voting machine. 
The core conclusion is [IPI01, p. 23]: “Poll site Internet voting appears potentially able 
to meet currently accepted levels of risk; remote voting, however, does not, at least with 
current or soon available technology. The possibility of large-scale automated attacks 
on remote Internet voting systems leads to a level of risk so high as to be unacceptable.” 
3.5 Research Group Internet Voting : i-vote 
The German Research Group Internet Voting of the University Osnabrueck has 
conducted a project including the set-up of an Internet voting system and evaluating it 
empirically in the context of real elections. The report doesn’t criticize remote Internet 
elections in principle, but argues more fuzzily claiming absolute secure voting clients, 
the certification of voting software and voting systems, and the use of chip cards with 
digital signatures. It admits, too, that much security research still has to be done. 
4 Conclusions 
Remote Internet voting heavily struggles with security issues and possible attacks that 
arise from the infrastructure, protocols, hardware, and software. There remain not only 
conceptual questions like how to deal with voting receipts and which voting protocol to 
use, but also everyday Internet problems like Trojan horses, viruses, spoofing, DDOS 
attacks, etc. Most reports clearly decline the appropriateness of today’s Internet for 
remote elections. Two characteristics impose security stakes on a level we haven’t faced 
before: (1) Remote Internet elections technically open a former closed voting 
environment to attackers all over the world who can gang together to selectively strike 
election processes. (2) The impact of a disrupted election can be large: the whole 
election might be questioned by an unsettled society and not less worse the election 
result might be notelessly effected. As our societies and states base on democracy and 
sound elections no described security risk is tolerable. According to Rivest [Riv01] 
adopting remote electronic voting means that we would have sacrificed too much 
security for the sake of voter convenience. However, the scale of security measures 
depends on the meaning of the election: voting a student parliament is not comparable 
with voting a national parliament that rules a state. Furthermore, supervised voting 
terminals and a closed Internet voting infrastructure don’t feature many problems 
discussed above and are worth being more explored. 
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